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1 Introduction
The study of principal-agents relationships and the design of the optimal incentive pro-
vision systems have a long tradition in economics. A particularly complex and very
common situation arises when agents have to allocate their time and effort among differ-
ent tasks. In this case, the provision of incentives on one task only may distort multitask
agents’ behavior: individuals may respond by increasing effort in the activities subject to
incentives, crowding out time and energy from other uses. This is especially the case if
performance in other tasks is not easy to measure, and if there are no other reasons, such
as social pressure or intrinsic motivation, to perform them in any case [Holmstrom and
Milgrom, 1991, 1994, Bru¨ggen and Moers, 2007, Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, Bandiera
et al., 2010, 2007, Benabou and Tirole, 2003, Prendergast, 2008].
While the theory related to multitask agents is very well-developed, starting from the
seminal work by Holmstrom and Milgrom [1991], empirical tests to the size and the sign
of the behavioural responses predicted by this type of models are difficult to implement
because of very heavy data requirements, first of all the need of an individual measure of
performance for each task, that is often not easily observable. The empirical literature is
therefore very scarce and the actual economic cost of standard incentives for multitasks
agents is still largely unknown. In practice, it depends on how the different tasks interact
in the agent’s production and cost functions and it is therefore specific to the actual tasks
taken into consideration.
This paper analyzes one of the leading examples of multitask agents: the case of uni-
versity professors. Faculty members allocate time among many activities, mostly teaching
and research. Incentives in most countries are however strongly skewed towards research:
the ‘Publish or Perish’ paradigm is the most popular criterion for faculty hiring and pro-
motion decisions in universities.This paper analyzes the overall consequences of strong
research incentives on teaching and research outcomes. It evaluates, first, the direct
impact of research incentives on research performance itself and, second, it studies the
indirect effect of research incentives on teaching quality. Moreover, in order to understand
the overall impact on teaching and research performance, it analyzes how the composi-
tion of professors changes under an incentive scheme strongly skewed towards research.
Finally, by analyzing the correlation between teaching and research, it evaluates what
may be the costs and benefits of separating teaching and research careers for university
professors.
Using a standard model of incentives where agents allocate effort between two different
tasks and ability is multidimentional, I show that the effect of stronger research incentives
on teaching and sorting of professors depends on two main parameters: on whether
teaching and research are substitute or complement in the professors’ cost function and
on whether teaching and research ability are correlated (i.e. whether good researchers are
also good teachers). I then estimates the sign of these parameters. I overcome many of
the standard identification issues by studying the case of Bocconi University, an Italian
private institution of tertiary education based in Milan. Its institutional setting provides a
unique opportunity to test the effect of research-oriented incentives on teachers’ allocation
of effort between multiple activities and the overall effect on the university’s teaching and
research outcomes.
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Three features of Bocconi’s institutional setting are crucial for my analysis. First, I
can construct a measure of teaching performance using a value added approach that is the
standard one used to evaluate teachers in primary or secondary schools [Rothstein, 2010,
Rockoff, 2004, Aaronson et al., 2007, Rivkin et al., 2005]. It is usually impossible to apply
this method to universities because students self-select into courses, exams and teachers
therefore, while the usual assumption that, conditional on previous test scores, allocation
is random is credible in primary and secondary schools, it does not hold in the university
context. Bocconi students instead are randomly assigned to teachers in each academic
year: within a degree program, if the number of enrolled students requires it, students are
randomly split in different classes, each of which taught by a different lecturer, while the
exam, the syllabus and the type of classrooms are identical for all students. Therefore, I
can compare the average class grade of students taught by different professors teaching
the same course.1 Second, Bocconi sharply changed its faculty’s incentive regime in 2005,
shifting the focus explicitly towards research, by strengthening research requirements for
promotion decisions and introducing monetary incentives based on quality and quantity
of publications. Third, the large heterogeneity of Bocconi teaching faculty’s contracts
provides a natural control group: many teachers are not fully hired by Bocconi and act
only as external teaching faculty. They have the same teaching responsibilities but are
not subject to Bocconi changes in promotion strategy and incentives.
This paper therefore estimates a difference in difference equation, evaluating teachers’
performance before and after 2005 and using external teachers as control group. Finally,
I check the robustness of my results by using two alternative control groups: (i) faculty
members who became tenured just before 2005, and are therefore not exposed anymore
to career concerns and (ii) faculty members of another Italian university (Bologna) very
similar to Bocconi in terms of quality and quantity of research.2
My main results are as follows. First, I find that the new incentive regime improved
both the quality and the quantity of published papers. After the change in the incentive
scheme Bocconi faculty members started to publish, on average, 25% more papers than
before. Moreover, the effect is mostly driven by young faculty members, whose career
concerns are stronger since they are not tenured yet. Both the magnitude and the sign of
this result are perfectly in line with the literature on piece rate incentives [Lazear, 2000].
Second, the introduction of incentives towards research had a negative impact on teaching
performance, as measured by time-varying teacher fixed effect. In particular teaching
quality decreased by 7% of a standard deviation under the new incentive regime. The
effect is, again, mostly driven by young faculty members and more negative for students
at the bottom of the ability distribution. Combining the two estimates on teaching
1In particular I estimate time varying teachers fixed effects, controlling for yearly shocks at the couse
level-such as shocks to the exam papers or to the syllabus. In principle I do not need to control for
students’ characteristics such as previous test scores, because of randomization of students across classes
within the same course: if the number of enrolled students requires it, students are randomly split in
different classes, each of which taught by a different lecturer, while the exam, the syllabus and the type
of rooms are identical across classes.
2This second strategy can only be applied to Research outcomes, because I do not have information
on teaching performance for the university of Bologna. I chose Bologna, because in terms on quality
of research as evaluated by the Italian Institute of University Research Evaluation (ANVUR) it is the
most similar to Bocconi University, in terms of dimension of the department and quality of the research
outcome between 2004-2010. www.anvur.org/rapporto/files/Area13/VQR2004-2010 Area13 Tabelle.pdf
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and research I find that, overall, one extra publication reduces teaching quality by one
third of a standard deviation. This suggests that, at least for the type of courses I am
considering, teaching and research are substitutes, not complement in the teachers’ cost
functions. Third, I find evidence of some positive sorting effects: the new incentive scheme
induced low ability researcher to leave. Forth, I document that teaching and research
abilities are positively correlated, this implies that if a university manages to attract
good researchers, it will also attract good teachers. The overall effect on teaching quality
is therefore ambiguous: on one side, since teaching and research effort are substitutes,
teaching quality of incumbents decreases, on the other side the policy pushed away the
worst researchers and, since research and teaching ability are positively correlated, also
the worst teachers.
This paper fits into the literature that investigates behavioral responses to incentives,
in particular in the context of multitask agents. As mentioned before, there is little
empirical evidence of the actual cost of not optimally designed incentive schemes for
multitask agents, mostly because of data limitations and because performance in many
tasks is difficult to measure, for instance because it refers to components that are not
observable or because it is difficult to disentangle the individual contribution to the final
outcome. Few exceptions, that usually analyze the quantity-quality trade off for the
same activity, are Dumont et al. [2008], Feng Lu [2012], Hong et al. [2013], Johnson and
Reiley [forthcoming]. In the education literature Jacob [2005], Fryer and Holden [2013]
analyze the impact of accountability policies on test-specific skills and students’ effort in
high-stake versus low-stake exams.
My paper contributes to the incentive literature, first, by providing a well-identified
estimate of how multiple tasks interact in the agents’ cost function. While most of the
existing papers look at the quality-quantity trade off of performing the same activity,
I analyze the effect on the performance in two different activities, when it is not clear
a priori whether the tasks are substitute or complement in the agents’ cost function.
Second, to my knowledge this is the first paper that combines estimates of the effort
substitution effect with an analysis of how multitask agents sort in different types of
firms, depending on the incentive schemes. This is key in order to evaluate the overall
effect for the principal on each task. Sorting effects may be very relevant and may
countervail the direct effort substitution effect so to revert the sign of the overall impact
of changes in the incentive scheme. Third, I am able to disentangle the pure effect of
monetary incentives from the effect generated also by career concerns: this is extremely
useful in order to understand the main drivers behind different responses and to be able
to efficiently reproduce the effects to other settings.
My paper is also related to the rather thin education literature on teachers’ contracts
and incentives. Some papers evaluate the effect of teaching contracts on teaching perfor-
mances [Figlio et al., 2013, Bettinger and Terry, 2010] and find that students learn more
from non-tenure line professors. Since non-tenure line faculty is less focused on research,
this may suggest that their results are driven by differences in teachers’ incentive schemes.
Still, it is impossible from these analyses to disentangle whether the effect they find is
instead driven by selection into non-tenure line jobs. For what concerns incentives, two
papers look at the trade-off between teaching and research, by analyzing the effect of
increased teaching incentives on research and teaching outcomes. Brickley and Zimmer-
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man [2001] use a single difference strategy to study the consequences of the introduction
of teaching performance incentives at the University of Rochester Business School. The
authors find a substantial and almost immediate jump in teaching ratings, measured by
students’ evaluations, and a corresponding decline in research output. Payne and Roberts
[2010] analyze this same issue but using between, not within, university variation. They
exploit US state variation in the adoption of teaching performance measures and find
that research activity decreased in quantity but improved in quality in non-flagship uni-
versities.
This paper contributes to the education literature in two ways. First, it is the only one,
to my knowledge, to test the other side of the relationship between teaching and research:
the effect of strong research incentives. This type of analysis is crucial given the extremely
wide adoption of research incentives in universities. Moreover, it is likely that the extent of
effort reallocation generated by research incentives is larger than for teaching incentives
because teaching effort is more difficult to measure and monitor and peer pressure on
excellence in teaching is much weaker than in research. Second, this paper provides the
first piece of evidence on the sign of the correlation between teaching and research ability.
The positive correlation between teaching and research has important implications for
the design of professors’ incentives and hiring schemes. For example, policies aimed at
increasing teachers’ specialization that propose to dedicate part of the faculty exclusively
to teaching and part of it exclusively to research, should take into consideration that
good researchers are also good teachers, on average.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a simple conceptual
framework that rationalize expected results; Section 3 outlines the identification strategy;
Section 4 describes the data and the institutional setting; Section 5 presents my empirical
results and Section 6 shows how my results are robust to alternative control groups.
Finally, Section 7 briefly characterizes the policy implications of my results and concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
This section presents a very simple framework with the aim of organizing and rationalizing
expected findings. The working of the model in the spirit of Holmstrom and Milgrom
[1991] and it is similar to the model presented by Fryer and Holden [2013].3
An agent, upon accepting the contract, takes two non-verifiable actions er and et,
which I call research and teaching effort respectively. Each action takes values in R+
and generates a performance measure mi = αiei where i = r, t and αi is unknown to the
principal. I refer at αi as the type of the agent on task i (her ability level).
I assume that the principal offers a linear incentive scheme of the form x = s+brmr +
btmt. If the agent accepts, she makes her effort choices, the performance measure is
realized and the principal pays the agent accordingly.
3I will not model why the university decided to increase research incentives, i.e. I do not make
assumptions on the university objective function, I only analyze what are the agents’ responses to an
increase in research incentive, in the spirit of Lazear [2000].
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I also assume that the agent’s preferences can be represented by the following CARA
utility function:
u(x, e) = −exp[−η(x− 1
2
(e2r + e
2
t )− δeret)] (1)
where x is the monetary payment and δ is the degree of substitutability between the
tasks r and t in the cost function (0 < δ < 1). Let U be the agent’s outside option if he
does not work. Moreover, I assume that there is a minimum teaching performance mt
and research performance mr required by the university.
The agent therefore maximizes utility with respect to er and et, subject to the partici-
pation constraints (u(x, e) > U and mr > mr and mt > mt). Note that when m
∗
r < mr or
m∗t < mt each individual will choose whether to stay and exert effort level e or to leave,
depending on whether U(xm, em) is larger or smaller than U .
4 If it is smaller, she will
decide to leave (or be fired). Otherwise, she will be induced to exert more effort, even if
very costly, in order to stay in the university.
The new incentive scheme, that took place at Bocconi in 2005 as I will describe with
more details in Section 3, implied an increase in br, the monetary return to research
activity, and in mr, the minimum research performance required, but only for professors
not tenured yet. Changes in br act mostly on the intensive margin (how much research
effort to exert), changes in mr instead mostly affect decisions also on the extensive margin
(whether to stay in university or not).
2.1 Effects on teaching and research performances
This section shows what happens to m∗r and m
∗
t (and therefore e
∗
r and e
∗
t ) if the university
increases br and mr and professors stay in the university.
In appendix A I solve the model (for internal solutions) and I show that the equilibrium
effort level is:
e∗r =
brαr − δbtαt
1− δ2 ; e
∗
t =
btαt − δbrαr
1− δ2 (2)
It is clear that e∗r increases if br increases, while the sign of the derivative of e
∗
t with
respect to br depends on the sign of δ.
Proposition 1 An increase of br, the marginal return on research performance, leads to
an increase in er.
The response of et depends on the value of δ:
{
∂et
∂br
< 0 ifδ > 0 (er and et substitute)
∂et
∂br
> 0 ifδ > 0 (er and et complement)
The policy, moreover, increased mr.
Proposition 2 When m∗r > m
′
r: an increase in mr does not have any effect.
When m∗r < m
′
r and U(xm′r , em′r) > U , mr and/or mt are binding and professors exert
emr,r or emt,t even if above their optimal level.
4em and U(xm, em) are respectively the effort need to exert in order to obtain m and the utility level
when mr and or mt are binding.
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2.2 Sorting effects
Whether agents will decide to continue working under the new regime or tp leave, depends
on U , the utility provided by leisure.
Increases in br, do not have any effect on the decision to continue working because,
at most, the agents will not change their behaviour. Increases in mr, instead, may have
effects on the decision to stop working.
Proposition 3 If m∗r < m
′
r and U(xm′r , em′r) < U , professors will leave the university
and enjoy utility U
Therefore, overall, for individuals whose m∗r > m
′
r, the effect of the policy comes
entirely from variations in br and therefore from evaluating the sign of the derivatives of
e∗r and e
∗
t with respect to br.
For individuals whose m∗r < m
′
r, the effect depends on whether U(xm, em) under the
new m′r is larger or smaller than U . If it is smaller, again, they will decide to leave and
exert no effort. Otherwise, they will be induced to exert more research effort, even if very
costly, and stay in the university.
I now evaluate how this effect varies by agent’s ability. It is important to keep in mind
that ∂er
∂αr
|mr=m < 0: research effort is more costly for low αr individuals. An increase in
research incentives, therefore will be much more beneficial for high ability researchers.
Instead, those more likely to leave because of an increase in mr are low ability researchers.
Proposition 4 When m∗r > mr: an increase in br, leads to a larger increase in er for
individuals with high αr and to a larger response of et for individuals with low αr.
For low αr agents, it is more likely that m
′
r is binding, and are therefore induced to leave.
The predicted response of stronger br along the distribution of αr is therefore that: (i)
for teaching, the effort substitution effect is stronger for low ability researchers (as long
as δ > 0); (ii) for research the effect is instead U shaped. Very low ability researchers
will leave the university; of those staying, the lowest ability ones (those whose m∗r < m
′
r)
will increase effort on research in order to reach m′r; the others (those whose m
∗
r > m
′
r),
will increase er proportionally with their ability αr.
3 Empirical strategy
This section develops my empirical strategy, aimed at estimating the causal effect of
increasing incentives towards publishing on teaching and research performance.
I use administrative data from Bocconi university archives to estimate two Difference-
in-Difference models, one for teaching and one for research, exploiting the sharp change
in Bocconi research incentives and using external faculty as control group.
I begin this section by describing in more details the reform in Bocconi’s incentives
regime announced in July 2005 (Section 3.1). Sections 3.2 and 3.3 present my empirical
model for the evaluation of the effect on teaching performance and on research activity
respectively. Finally, section 3.4 describes how I estimate sorting effects.
7
3.1 The new incentive policy
In 2005, Bocconi University unexpectedly announced the adoption of a new policy of
hirings and promotions. The Board of Directors called for the Rector to make Bocconi
University one of the top five universities in Europe. As a consequence, the old hiring and
promotion strategies, mainly based on national competitions and seniority, were replaced
with new practices based on international standards. Since then5, an independent com-
mittee, composed of faculty members from all disciplines, has been in charge of recruiting
and promotions. Decisions have been centralized at the university level, making excep-
tions impossible. Moreover, the importance of research outcomes in promotion decisions
was clearly stated in all internal faculty contracts.
The goals of the New Strategic Plan, as announced in July 2005, were the following:
(i) recruiting at least 50% of new faculty on the international job market; (ii) improving
the systems to evaluate research produced by each professor (through the creation of
an independent evaluation committee and the internationalization of evaluation criteria);
(iii) adopting clear incentives on research (both monetary6 and career-based); (iv) creating
mechanisms to “attract and keep the best researchers worldwide”.
The focus switched explicitly towards research, tenure decisions started to be based
almost entirely on scientific productivity and the requirements on quantity and quality
of research started to be much tighter.
3.2 Research Performance
I first evaluate whether incentives on publishing have an impact on research quality or
quantity.
I use three different measures of research performance: (i) the number of publications;
(ii) a proxy of the index actually used by Bocconi to evaluate teachers (which is computed
as the sum of the number of articles published by each teacher, weighted by the quality
of the journals as classified by Bocconi7, divided by the number of coauthors) and (iii)
the number of working papers and published papers (from Google Scholar).
I collect publication data from the Web of Science website. In particular, I count
professors’ yearly publications in the fields categorized by Web of Science as ‘business’,
‘maths’ and ‘economics’. Unfortunately, for less recent years, the Web of Science database
only reports the author’s first name initial and not the full name. As such, I run a search
only using the authors’ first name initial, together with their surname.
5The actual implementation of the policy was in 2007, but throughout the analysis I will consider
the year of the announcement, 2005, as the treatment year. Be aware that the full effect will be in place
starting from 2007.
6Even if previously anticipated, Bocconi started to actually provide monetary incentives to its internal
faculty in the academic year 2008. In particular there are three types of incentives: (i) the possibility of
getting ”research profile”, with less teaching duties; (ii) research premia that depend on the number and
the quality of publications; (iii) research funds, given to everybody who has reached a minimum level of
research productivity in the previous two years. Publications were weighted depending on the quality of
the journal)
7Bocconi divides journals into 3 categories: A+ journals (i.e. Econometrica), to which it assigns
a weight of 15; A journals (i.e. Economic Journal), weighted 7; B journals (i.e. Economic Letters),
weighted 3. I classified journals using the list valid for the year 2007, available upon request.
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I use Google Scholar as a source for the number of working papers. In particular, I
use a web scraping program which makes automatic searches (one for each year/professor
combination) from the Google Scholar website. I restrict my research on the Google
Scholar website to the following fields: ‘social sciences, arts, and humanities’ and ‘busi-
ness, administration, finance, and economics’. In this case, data on full names are avail-
able for all years. I thus look for full names.8
I then implement a Difference-in-Difference model by estimating the following equa-
tion for the years between 2001 and 2010:
pubpt = θt + θp + γres(internalp ∗ post2006t) + γ4Xpt + ηpt (3)
where pubpt are publications of professor p in year t; internalp is the internal status (in
2005); θt are time fixed effects; θp are teacher fixed effects; Xpt are teacher characteristics
(age, age squared) and ηpt is the error term. I cluster standard errors by professor.
For sake of consistency, I include only teachers who were teaching classes I can use
to estimate the teaching equation (see below equation 5).9 Moreover, in order to exclude
endogenous status switches from internal to external or viceversa after the introduction of
the policy, I classify teachers as internal if they were internal in 2005. In my robustness
checks (Section 5.3) I check my results are not driven by this choice, by running the
same analysis using contemporaneous status instead of status before 2006 as treatment,
therefore including endogenous ‘switches’ in the effect. Moreover, I drop internal lecturers.
Lecturers are internal professors (fully hired by Bocconi) but with only teaching duties.10
On one side, monetary research incentives are not provided to lecturers but, on the other
side, the way lectureship decisions are taken has probably changed after 2006. They
therefore do not represent a good control group. In a robustness check (Section 5.3), I
include lecturers and interact them with the treatment. Fibally, I drop law professors and
law courses: law’s exams are usually oral exams so the set of questions is not the same
for all students. It is therefore difficult to use average grade as a measure of teaching
quality.
3.3 Teaching Performance
Second, I estimate my empirical model for the effect on teaching in two steps.
The first step uses microdata from the student academic curriculum database and it
is aimed at computing the average grade at the class level, conditional on students’ high
8 This procedure does not eliminate the possibility that the same working paper is counted more than
once, if published in two different versions. However, this is still a measure of the effort one puts in
that specific research. Moreover, this measure also contains the published version of the working papers.
Accessed in Dec 2011.
9The difference in the number of observations is given by those teachers who were teaching more than
one class per year or by the fact that some teachers do not teach compulsory undergraduate courses all
years, but I still include those year observations in my analysis, for consistency over time.
10The difference between the position of lecturers and assistant/full professors is clear from how their
contracts. The contract for assistant professors states ”responsibilities include teaching and, most im-
portantly, productivity in research”. The contract for lecturers, instead, states that only teaching duties
are expected from lecturers. Research activity is not even mentioned.
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school final score and demographics.11 Students taking the same course are all taught
the same syllabus and are all examined on the same questions, independently of the
class to which they are (randomly) assigned. Some variations in the material and in the
exam across degree programs are allowed (this is why I correct for the full interaction of
courses, degree programs and years). Usually a senior member of the faculty acts as the
course coordinator: he establishes the material to teach, manages possible complications
and prepares the exam paper. Grading is instead generally delegated to the individual
teachers, who typically are supported in the marking by teaching assistants.
I estimate the following equation:
gradeipct = β0 + β1HSgradei + β2Xi + αptc + uipct (4)
where gradeipct is the grade obtained by student i, with teacher p
12, in year t, in
course c (standardized at the course-year level to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1);
HSgradei is student i high school final grade; Xi are the students’ individual character-
istics (gender, age, whether Italian, whether from Milan, type of high school attended).
uipct is the error term. αpct, the year specific teacher fixed effect, is my parameter of
interest.
The second step evaluates how the teacher fixed effects αptc evolve over time, in
response to the change in incentive regime. I implement the same Difference-in-Difference
estimation as in Section 3.2, changing the dependent variable. In particular, I estimate
the following equation:
α̂ptc = δp + δtc + γteach(internalp ∗ post2006t) + γ2Xpt + ptc (5)
where internalp is a dummy equal to one if the professor was internal before the change
in incentives; post2006t is a post reform dummy; δp are teacher fixed effects
13; δtc are fixed
effects for the full interaction between academic years, courses and degree programs14;
Xpt are time-varying professor characteristics (age, age squared, experience in teaching
undergraduate courses in Bocconi) and ptc is the error term. I cluster standard errors by
professor.
γteach quantifies the change in teaching performance of incumbent professors under
the new incentive scheme more focussed towards research.
The economics literature usually measures teacher quality by estimating a teacher
fixed effect in equation 4. Here, differently from most of the previous analyses, I allow
teacher effects to vary over time and I analyze how they change in response to the positive
shock in research activity.
11To reduce computational burden, I exploit randomization of students to teachers and I do not include
students fixed effects.
12Since in around 40% of the cases more than 1 professor teaches the same class the actual meaning
of p in this first case is the ”professor mix” of the class.
13Notice that in this case p represents a single teacher. Therefore if a class was taught by multiple
teachers I impute the (unique) class fixed effect to both teachers.
14Courses may have the same code but programs and exams may be different for different degree pro-
grams. Interacting also with degree programs allows me to exploit variation across teachers’ performance
when syllabus and exam papers are exactly the same (and over which the randomization of students to
teachers takes place).
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I overcome many of the standard identification problems because: (i) I eliminate
concerns related to time constant factors by including teachers’ fixed effects in my re-
gressions. I only analyze how teaching performance evolves over time; (ii) the presence
of a unique final exam and the randomization of students to teachers eliminates concerns
on time varying endogenous matching. There has been a debate (Rothstein [2010, 2009],
Ishii and Rivkin [2009], Kane and Staiger [2008], Chetty et al. [2013]) about whether
value-added models perform weakly in the absence of randomization. Teachers fixed ef-
fects may also identify endogenous matching between teachers and students. Results are
mixed. Most recently Kane and Staiger [2008], Chetty et al. [2013] use primary school
data to show that this problem can be eliminated controlling for previous year test score.
However, the problem of endogenous matching is likely to be much worse in the university
context, where students self-select into courses and therefore teachers.
Finally, I estimate the same effect running the analysis directly at the student level.
I therefore estimate the following equation:
gradeiptc = ζp + ζtc + ζteach(internalp ∗ post2006t) + ζ2Xipt + viptc (6)
where all the variables are defined as before and viptc is the error term.
While my preferred specification is the estimation of equation 5, because it is more
easily interpretable as changes in teaching quality, this last specification will allow me to
evaluate how the main effect is heterogeneous with respect to students’ characteristics,
in particular with respect to students’ ability, measured by their final high school grade.
3.4 Sorting Patterns
To have a complete picture of the overall effect of the change in incentives on research and
teaching quality, I analyze how the composition of workers changed after the new regime
was introduced. As shown in Section 2, the change in minimum research requirements
should push low ability researchers away. Whether this translates into maintaining also
better teachers, it will depend on how teaching and research ability are correlated.
I analyze selection effects in two ways: first, I compare estimates with and without
professors’ fixed effects; second, I obtain direct estimates of the underlying teaching and
research abilities and I analyze how the ability composition of teachers varies over time,
looking both at teachers sorting in and sorting out.
In order to analyze sorting patterns, I need estimates of teaching and research ability.
I obtain these estimates estimating professors’ fixed effects from the following equations.
For teaching:
α̂ptc = θ
t
p + δtc + γ2Qpt + ptc (7)
where αptc is the conditional average grade of professor p, teaching course c in year t; δtc
are fixed effects for every course-year; Qpt are professor characteristics (age, age squared,
years of experience at Bocconi); ptc is an error term. Finally, θ
t
p are professor fixed effects,
my estimate of underlying teaching ability.
Analogously, for research:
pubpt = θ
r
p + ζt + ζ2Qpt + ηpt (8)
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where pubpt is the number of papers published by professor p in year t; ζt are year fixed
effects, that absorb any possible time trend in how difficult it is to publish papers over
time; Qpt are professor characteristics (age, age squared); ηpt is an error term. Again, θ
r
p
are professor fixed effects, my estimate of underlying research ability.
One first concern may be that, since incentives are muted under the new scheme, it is
not clear whether fixed effects based on teaching or research productivity after 2006 are
a good proxy for ability. This would imply one should only use fixed effects evaluated
before 2006. However, it would be impossible to test whether the new policy managed
to attract high ability professors, since I would not be able to estimate a teacher fixed
effect for faculty members who entered under the new incentive regime. In Figure 4, I
follow Lazear [2000] and I show that, for professors who were teaching also before 2006,
there is a strong positive correlation between fixed effects evaluated in the period before
2006 and those estimated for the period after 2006. Whenever it is possible (for sorting
out effects), I will run my regressions also using fixed effects estimated on the pre-2006
period only.
Before showing the specifications, one caveat need to be borne in mind. First, for
this analysis I do not run a proper diff-in-diff strategy because I do not know the entire
employment history of external teachers. I only observe whether they were teaching
undergraduate compulsory courses in each year between 2001 and 2011, but I do not
observe their exact year of entry/exit. For internal professors, instead, I know exactly
their year of entry, every change in their contracts and their year of exit, including the
reason for leaving. Moreover, it is very unlikely that external teachers represent a good
control group for the analysis on sorting: the way they are selected is very different from
the selection process of internal faculty and it varies substantially depending on specific
departments and academic years.
I evaluate how average teaching and research ability change, depending on the year
teachers enterd/exited Bocconi.
For sorting out, I estimate the following equation:
θ̂jp = α1exitpost2006p + α2exitpre2006p + α3Xp + δe + up (9)
where: j = r, t; δe are year of entry fixed effects; exitpost2006p is a dummy equal to one
if teacher p left Bocconi after 2005; exitpre2006p is a dummy equal one if professor p
left Bocconi before 200515; Xp are time-invariant professors’ characteristics (age of entry,
gender) and up is an error term. I only include teachers leaving Bocconi for reasons
different from retirement.
Symmetrically, I obtain the effects on sorting in of teachers, by estimating the following
equation:
θ̂jp = ψ1entrypost2006p + ψ3Xp + ψ4f(e) + ωp (10)
where: j = r, t; f(e) is a linear and squared trend for year of entry; entrypost2006p is
a dummy equal to one if teacher p entered after 2005; Xp are time-invariant professors’
characteristics (age of entry, gender) and ωp is an error term. To make the two groups
15the omitted category are those staying
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of teachers more comparable, I estimate equation 10 only for teachers who entered after
2000.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Students
This paper uses the administrative records of individual students and teachers from Boc-
coni University, an Italian private institution of tertiary education based in Milan. Boc-
coni offers degree programs in Economics, Management and Law. I only consider com-
pulsory undergraduate courses between 2001 and 2011. My sample includes around 700
teachers and 30,000 students, who take on average 20 compulsory exams over the 3 years
of study.
My data cover in detail the entire academic history of students, including their ba-
sic demographics (gender, place of residence and place of birth), high school leaving
grades as well as high school type (whether focusing on humanities, on sciences or techni-
cal/vocational subjects). Information is also provided on the grades in each single exam
together with the date when the exams were sat. Moreover, I have access to the random
class identifiers of students, which allows me to determine in which class each student
attended each course.16
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for students. Most of the students are Italian,
one fourth is from Milan. They are positively selected among the population of high
school graduates: the average high school final grade is very high (0.9 out of a maximum
of 117). On average there are 5 classes per course, of about 110 students each, and 20
compulsory undergraduate courses per year. Each student sits on average 7 exams per
year. The degree program in Management is the one with the highest number of classes
(7 on average).
4.2 Teachers
Together with student data, I have access to administrative data on Bocconi faculty.
In particular, I have information on teachers’ demographics (date of birth, gender, full
name), type of contract, department of affiliation and number of teaching hours in each
course and class. I am therefore able to match students with teachers.
I classify each teacher as internal or external. Table 2 lists all different teaching
contracts available at Bocconi over the years I consider and the way I group them into
five categories: assistant professors-junior researchers, associate professors, full professors,
non academics and professors from other universities. I define teachers in the first three
16 Students students who did not sit the exam in the academic year they were supposed to, are
randomly allocated to a new class and the records on the initial class allocation are overwritten in the
administrative database. I therefore include them in the new class, including a dummy equal to one if
the student took the exam in a different year from what expected. However, this is a very small group
(about 3% of students).
17Given that I know the maximum final high school grade each foreign student can take, I standardize
high school final grades of foreign students to be between 0.6 and 1, so that they are comparable with
grades of Italian students.
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categories as internal, treated by incentives, and teachers in the last two categories as
external, my control group.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics of teachers. Column (1) reports descriptives for
internal teachers, column (2) for external teachers and columns (3) reports the difference
of the two groups. In total, in my sample, I observe 681 teachers for 5 years on average.
Internal teachers tend to be slightly older and to teach more hours at Bocconi. Most
teachers are hired by the Management or Economics department. Finally, assistant pro-
fessors and external faculty members represent 30% of the sample each, while associate
and full professors represent around 15% each.
4.3 Students Teachers Randomization
The randomization of students to teachers is performed every year via a simple random
algorithm that assigns a class identifier to each student, within each degree program18.
Table 4 provides evidence that teachers were actually randomized to students. Following
Braga et al. [2011] I show results of a regression of class (student) average characteristics
on teacher characteristics and dummies for the full interaction of courses, academic years
and degree programs.19 The null hypothesis under consideration is the joint significance of
the coefficients on teacher characteristics. The F statistics are always very low, suggesting
there is no significant correlation between students’ and teachers’ characteristics.
5 Empirical results
5.1 Results for Research
The sign of the effect on research is expected, from Section 2, to be positive and stronger
for young professors not tenured yet, since they are affected both by the monetary incen-
tives and to progress in their careers.
Table 5 shows some descriptive statistics for the number and the quality of publications
and working papers for internal and external teachers before and after 2006.
The first panel analyzes the total number of publications (books or journal articles)
of professor p in year t, as collected from the Web of Science database. The second
panel looks at the number of publications, weighted by the importance they have in
terms of Bocconi’s new incentive regime. This allows me to evaluate quality as well as
quantity of research production.20 Finally, the third panel evaluates the effect on the
number of working papers from Google Scholar.21 The first column reports the mean and
the standard deviation of publications for internal and external teachers. The second
and the third columns break down the number of publications for the period before
and after 2006. Finally, the number in the bottom-right corner represents the simple
18The university administration adopted the policy of repeating the randomization for each course
with the explicit purpose of encouraging wide interactions among the students.
19This is the level at which randomization takes place
20This variables moreover eliminates much more the problem of homonymity because all journals where
Bocconi faculty publishes should be inserted in the list. Therefore only homonymous people in exactly
the same sub-filed may be considered.
21Accessed in july 2011.
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difference in difference, without any control. Standard errors, clustered at the teacher
level, are reported in parenthesis. The Table shows that the number and the quality of
publications increased after 2006 and they increased much more for internal professors
than for external professors.
Table 6 shows results from equation 3, using the same three dependent variables.
Columns (1) and (2) report estimates without teacher fixed effects. The effect is
positive and significant in all three panels. Once I include teacher fixed effects (columns
(3) and (4)) the effect is still positive and significant. After the introduction of research
incentives, the number of publications increased by 0.14 (36% over the mean) for internal
faculty and the index used by Bocconi to evaluate teachers increased by 0.13 (16% over
the mean). The number of working papers of internal professors is also 0.15 (10% over
the mean) higher than it would have been otherwise. Moreover, while columns (1) and
(3) look at the aggregate effect, columns (2) and (4) separately evaluate the effect for
for assistant professors and associate professors (which I call junior faculty) and full
professors. The aggregate effect is mostly driven by junior faculty, as their career concerns
are stronger. The magnitude of the effects I estimate is in line with what is found and
predicted by the general incentive theory [Prendergast, 1999, Lazear, 2000].
Finally columns (5) and (6) report results from estimating equation 3, using as de-
pendent variable the square root of the number of publication. This is to try tackle
simultaneously the presence of possible outliers and of a lot of zeros.22
Figure 1 displays the evolution of the difference in average number of publications
between internal and external faculty.23 The dotted lines refer to the 10% confidence
interval boundaries. While the difference is rather stable before 2005, it gets larger after
the introduction of research incentives. Moreover, given the long time needed to publish
papers in most disciplines, after 2006 there is a clear change in trends but there is not a
sharp jump.
5.2 Results for Teaching
As shown in Section 2, the sign of the effect of stronger research incentives on teaching
quality depends on whether teaching and research efforts are complements or substitutes
in the professors’ cost function (δ smaller or larger than 0 respectively). The effect
moreover is expected to be stronger for junior professors, exposed both to the change in
monetary incentives and to the change in the minimum number of publications required.
Table 7 presents the results obtained from estimating equation 4. Exam grades are
standardized to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1 within the same course-year.24
Results show that being male, with a higher final high school grade, Italian and from
Milan is associated with higher university exam grades25.
22Moreover I dropped the 5/1000 highest values for each dependent variable. It is very likely that
most outliers are generated by homonymity.
23This graph plots the coefficient γt of the following equation:
pubpt = θt + θp + γt(internalp ∗ θt) + γ4Qpt + ηpt
.
24This is in order to make the estimated αpct comparable because not dependent on the difficulty of a
particular exams.
25Grades in Italy go from 18 (pass) to 31 (excellence).
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Table 8 reports some summary statistics of the estimated αpct for internal and external
teachers, before and after 2006. While before 2006, the teaching performance of the two
groups was very similar, after 2006 it improved much more for external teachers than
for internal teachers. Again, the bottom-right corner reports the diff in diff, without any
control.26
Table 9 displays results from estimating equation 5. The first two columns show results
without teacher fixed effects. Column (3) and (4) add teachers fixed effects. Teaching
quality of internal teachers is 0.04 (around 7% of a standard deviation) lower after the
change in incentives than it would have been otherwise. This suggests that teaching and
research are substitutes in the professors’ cost function. Again, the effect is stronger for
young faculty members, more exposed to the policy.
Panel a and b of Figure 2 show the evolution of the different performance of external
and internal teachers (panel a) and external and assistant professors (panel b) over time27.
The difference is rather stable before the academic year 2005/2006 (named 2006 in the
graph). Right after the adoption of the new incentive regime there is a drop in the
quality of teaching for internal professors. In the following years, the performance is still
slightly worse than before the reform, but better than in 2006. This may be because
internal professors understood the consequences of their effort reallocation and partially
readjusted their behaviour. Alternatively, they just started being more generous with
their grading standards.
Table 10 reports results from the student level regression (equation 6).28 As expected,
results are very similar. What differentiates columns (1) and (2) of Table 10 from columns
(3) and (4) of Table 9 is the way observations are weighted and coefficients should be
interpreted. Table 10 implicitly weights observations by the number of students in each
class: the coefficients should be interpreted as effects on average students’ performance.
Table 9 weights observations by teachers and the coefficients should be interpreted as
effects of average teachers’ performance.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 10 explore whether the main results of Table 9 mask
some important heterogeneity at the student level. I estimate equation 10, interacting
the main effect with a proxy for students’ ability. In particular I use high school final
grade as proxy.29 My omitted category are high ability students. Results show that the
negative effect is mostly borne by low ability students.
This result suggests that there is room for policies aimed at matching professors to
students in order to reduce the overall negative effect of stronger research incentives on
teaching. This would mean in this case to match young researchers, more affected by
26notice that, because of some sampling error generated by the fact that ˆαpct are estimated, the
reported standard deviation may be larger than the standard deviation of the true αpct.
27This is obtained by plotting the coefficients γt obtained from the following equation:
αptc = δp + δtc + γt(internalp ∗ δt) + γ2Qpt + γ3Zpct + ptc
Year 2001 (and the interaction between 2001 and internal) is omitted. The dotted lines refer to the 10%
confidence interval bands.
28In this case, whenever a class was taught by more than one teacher, the observations for each student
were doubled, such that each student was imputed to every teacher he was assigned to.
29I divide it into 3 categories: (i) high ability (omitted)= those students whose final high school grade
was between 1 and 0.9; middle ability = between 0.8 and 0.9 and low ability: below 0.8.
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the change in incentives, to higher ability students, who are less damaged by their lower
teaching quality.
5.3 Robustness Checks for the effect on teaching
Table 11 presents a first set robustness checks for the estimation of the teaching equation.
First, I estimate equation 5 excluding the academic years 2008/2009, 2009/2010 and
2010/2011. Starting from 2008/2009, internal faculty was exposed not only to research
incentives, but also to teaching performance monetary awards. In particular, Bocconi
University created a commission in charge of awarding a premium of 20,000 euros for
the best 20 teachers who voluntarily apply. Decisions are based on students’ evaluations.
This new policy may attenuate the effect of research incentives (Holmstrom and Milgrom
[1991, 1994]). Column (1) of Table 11 shows that results are almost unchanged. Second,
in Column (2) I also include lecturers in my sample and I estimate a different treatment
effect for lecturers. The effect on internal professors is similar. The effect on lecturers,
even if not significant because of the small number of observations, is negative. Column
(3) includes endogenous switches from internal to external status after the policy: it uses
the contemporaneous status, not the status before 2006 as in Table 9, to define internal
status. The control group includes in this case also, for instance, professors who switched
from internal to external as a consequence of the policy. The coefficient is still negative
and significant, but the magnitude is smaller. This means that Bocconi promotions from
external to internal and viceversa where positively correlated with teaching quality. In
column (4) I weight my regression by the number of hours taught by each professor in
each class. Results are very similar.
I now discuss three possible confounding factors, that may undermine my identifi-
cation strategy. The first is that students might not comply with the random class as-
signment and they might endogenously decide to attend classes with different lecturers.
For example, they may match to the best professors, or attend classes with their closest
friends. Unfortunately, I do not have any direct information on these unofficial switches
of classes.30 Braga et al. [2011] analyze whether the direction of class switches at Bocconi
University is correlated with professors’ ability. They use data on students’ answer to an
item in the student evaluation forms asking them about the level of congestion in their
classroom. They estimate the degree of class switches as the difference in congestion
level between the most congested and the least congested classes for each course. They
find that, overall, course switching is not related to teacher effectiveness in any direction.
Therefore, if the process of class switching is unrelated to teachers or students quality,
then it will just affect the precision of my estimated class effects. Moreover, if the process
is constant over time, the effect will go away with professors’ fixed effects. Finally, even
if course switching does affect my results, it would probably bias them against finding a
negative effect on teaching performance. It is likely that students, if anything, will react
by attending classes with the best teachers, who after the change of incentives will more
likely be external faculty members. This would reduce the negative effect of the incentive
policy on teaching.
30Bocconi decided to hand in evaluation forms to a subsample of professors only exactly in the year
2005 and 2006, making it impossible to look at students’ evaluations for the period I am interested in.
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Another concern is that teachers may change the way they grade students’ exams as
an effect of observing worse performances of their students. There is not a common rule
on how exams are graded in Bocconi: in some cases exam papers are randomly given to
class teachers to be graded, in some other cases each professor is in charge of grading his
own group. I do not have information on how exam papers are actually graded in each
course. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 12 I look at the effect on teaching quality for
exams that are more objectively-graded, such as math, statistics or quantitative finance.
Results show that, even if the effect is slightly smaller and less precise for this types of
courses, it remains negative.31 Moreover, again, if anything, I expect internal teachers to
start being more lenient towards their students, therefore I expect this type of bias to go
against finding a negative effect on teaching performance.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 12, I check whether the new incentive regime induced
internal teachers to change their teaching load and duties. I estimate equation 5 using
as dependent variables a dummy equal to one if professor p was the course coordinator
in year t and the number of teaching hours taught by professor p in year t, respectively.
Results show that there is no significant change in the type of teaching loads and duties
before and after the change in the incentive regime. This suggests that the change in
teaching quality was not driven by other, simultaneously related, changes in how teaching
was organized and distributed.
Finally, in Table 13, I check whether my results may be driven by a recommendation
letter sent by Bocconi University in 2006 to the entire teaching faculty, asking for higher
homogeneity of grades across classes. This may affect my analysis, if internal and external
teachers responded to this request differently. Table 13 displays the standard deviation
of average class grades across classes belonging to the same course and degree program,
by academic year and by whether the teachers were internal or external. The variability
of grades between classes did not decrease right after 2006, as a consequence of such
recommendation, either for internal and for external teachers.
5.4 Teaching and Research ability
Understanding the sign of the correlation between αr and αt, as defined in Section 2,
is crucial both to have a full picture of potential sorting effects and to understand the
plausible cost of separating careers of teachers and researcher in university.
Figure 5 and Table 15 correlate the two sets of fixed effects as estimated from equation
7 and 8 and show that teaching and research ability are strongly positively correlated:
good researchers are also good teachers. This is an important result that has not been
estimated before. Columns (1) and (3) include all teachers in my sample. Columns (2)
and (4) try to address the fact that teacher fixed effects represent noisy measures of the
true teaching and research abilities and sampling error may bias the coefficients of columns
(1) and (3). I exploit the fact that sampling error decreases substantially if the analysis
is performed on a subsample of teachers with a large number of observations. I therefore
estimate the correlation, including only teachers for which I can estimate the fixed effects
with more that 5 observations.32 Results are very similar but, as expected, after the
31Notice that it may be that what generates these results is just the fact that teaching are research
efforts are more complement for math subjects than for other subjects.
32Notice that I always estimate the research fixed effect with 10 (yearly) observations. For the teaching
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correction the coefficients are larger, because not affected anymore by the attenuation
bias.
This result has crucial policy implications. First, comparing the standard deviation of
the fixed effects plotted in Figure 5, which quantify the effectiveness of the time-invariant
part of teaching quality, with the coefficients obtained in Tables 6 and 9, it is clear that
sorting effects may potentially have much larger and substantial consequences on the over-
all productivity than substitution effects. Keeping the composition of teachers constant,
the reform of the incentive structure improved research productivity by around 20% (in
line with most of the literature on piece-rate incentives) and decreased teaching quality
by 7% of a standard deviation. Instead, when we allow the composition of teachers to
change and we incorporate the fact that universities will, as a consequence, attract (push
away) the best (worst) researchers, the average productivity may potentially increase by
much more. Therefore, it is true that Section 5.2 showed that, at the margin, pushing
university professors to focus more on research may induce them to crowd out time from
preparing teaching classes and may worsen their teaching performance. However, Figure
5 shows that sorting effect may potentially be much more effective.
Second, the fact that teaching and research ability are positively correlated entails 
that if universities are able to attract good researchers, they will also, indirectly, improve 
teaching quality. One of the most popular proposal to solve the trade-off between teach-ing 
and research, is to increase specialization of faculty members. This would entail, for 
example, the creation of two groups of professors, one more research-oriented and one 
more teaching-oriented. Figure 5 and Table 15 show that these proposals should take 
into consideration that good researchers are also good teachers and the potential benefit 
of separating careers may be minimal.
5.5 Sorting
The first way I analyze sorting effects is by evaluating the difference between the OLS
and the fixed effect estimates in Tables 6 and 9. OLS estimates are always larger than
fixed effects estimates, suggesting that the policy induced some positive sorting effects.
As mentioned in Section 5.5, I also analyze sorting in and out separately using direct
estimates of teachers’ underlying ability, obtained through equations 7 and 8.-off.
Table 16 shows how teachers’ fixed effects change for (internal) professors fired before
and after the change in the incentive regime, for research ability and teaching ability
respectively. Columns (1) and (2) use fixed effects estimated for the entire period. The
dependent variable of columns (3) and (4) are, instead, fixed effects estimated for the pre
2006 period only. Results, in line from the predictions of Section 2, show that the change
in incentives induced worse researchers and therefore worse teachers to leave.
Table 17 reports instead results from equation 10 and it shows no effects on Bocconi’s
ability of attracting good teachers or good researchers. The reason why I don’t find any
positive sorting-in effect, partly in contrast with what is expected from the results of
Section 2, may be due to the fact that it takes time to publish papers and it may be too
early to evaluate the research and teaching productivity of very young scholars.
fixed effects, instead, the number of teacher-specific observations used depends on the number of time I
observe teacher p teaching undergraduate compulsory courses.
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5.6 Heterogeneity by teachers’ ability
This Section analyzes how the effect on teaching and research performances changes
with respect to teachers’ ability. Section 2 shows that the bulk of the effort reallocation
should be concentrated on low ability researchers, while the effect on research should
be concentrated on very low (because of fair of being fired) or very high (because they
benefit more from any unit of effort in research) ability researchers.
Column 1 of Table 14 shows that the negative effect on teaching activity is stronger for
low ability researchers than for higher ability ones. The Tables displays the coefficients of
the internalp ∗ post2006t dummy of equation 5 interacted with research ability tertiles.33
For what concerns the heterogeneity of the effect on research performance, columns 2
and 3 of Table 14 show that the positive effect is driven by low ability and middle ability
researchers. The difference is more evident in column 3, that looks at the effect on the
number of working papers.
6 Alternative Control Groups
One possible concern of using external teachers as control group is that these teachers
may react to the policy as well if, for instance, their final objective is to be hired by
Bocconi. This would spoil my identification strategy because it implies that the effect
of the policy would spill over my control group. Moreover, one may think that external
teachers are a natural control group for evaluating the effect on teaching performance
but may not be as good as a control group for research activity, because they may have
very different research productivity and may be on very different trends in any case. To
tackle these issues I propose two alternative control groups.
The first one refers to the analysis on research. In Table 19, I use all professors belong-
ing to Bologna University faculty in 2005 as alternative control group. Bologna University
is another Italian University, whose department of management and economics is quite
similar to Bocconi University in terms of quality of the economics/management depart-
ment. Bologna university’s economics and management department is indeed ranked as
the best34 department among Italian public institutions. Table 18 shows the productivity
of Bologna University faculty members in terms of research, compared to Bocconi’s fac-
ulty members. Again, I obtain data on their publications from the Web of Science website
and data on the faculty composition in 2005 from the website of the Italian Ministry of
Education.35
The second alternative control group are professors who became tenured before the
policy. Given that the change in the incentive structure acts mainly in terms of promo-
tions and tenure decisions, full professors should only be marginally affected. Since they
are already fully hired by Bocconi, they should not react to changes in hiring/promotion
strategies. If we assume that the effect of monetary incentives is the same on full and
junior professors, than what I estimate using full professors as control group is the effect
33Tertiles are calculated using θrp of equation 8, and are estimated only for the years before the change
in the incentive regime. This is to avoid that the way ability is measured is affected by the change in
incentive regime itself.
34or one of the top three departments, depending on the ranking considered
35www.miur.it
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of the change in career requirements only. However, it is very likely that trends for junior
and senior professors are very different, after they get tenured, especially for publications,
since tenure decisions are, indeed, based research productivity or potential productivity.
I will therefore use this alternative control group only for the analysis on teaching.
Moreover, both for the analysis on teaching and on research, I estimate my difference-
in-difference separately on two subsamples of professors with similar age. In particular I
split both the sample of internal and external teachers between those older than 43 (the
mean age) and those younger than 41. This allows me to use as control group for young
researchers, young external researchers since, especially for research, junior and senior
faculty members may be on very different trends.
Table 19 reports results for research activity. In columns (1) and (2) I run equation
4 on the subsample of teachers younger and older than 43, respectively. As for the main
results, the effect is larger for junior professors. Columns (3), (4) and (5) use, instead,
Bologna faculty members as control group. Column (3) looks at the aggregate effect,
column (4) looks at junior professors and column (5) at full professors. The effect is
remarkably similar to my baseline estimates. The introduction of incentives led to an
increase in the number of publication of 0.17 for Bocconi faculty members. The increase
is stronger for young faculty members.
Table 20 reports, instead, results for teaching quality. Columns (1) and (2) split
again the sample by age. The effect is similar to what found in my baseline estimates
and is more negative for junior professors. Columns (3) and (4) use full professors as
alternative control group. Columns (3) does not include teacher fixed effects, without
and with specific trends for junior and full professors respectively. Columns (4) shows
results including teachers fixed effects. Again, results are remakably similar to what
found in Table 9. The introduction of research incentives worsened teaching performance
by 0.04, about 7% of a standard deviation. I can’t use Bologna faculty members as
control group for the analysis on teaching, because information on teaching performance
of Bologna faculty members is not publicly available.
Figure 3 checks the presence of parallel trends.
7 Conclusions
This paper exploits a natural experiment to test predictions of models of incentives in
a multitask environment. I use administrative data from Bocconi University to analyze
faculty reaction to a sharp increase in research incentives. The heterogeneity in the
teaching faculty type of contracts allows me to find a control group for my Difference-in-
Difference estimation. The randomization of teachers to students within the same course,
in a context where the syllabus and the exams are fixed, allows me to build a credible
measure of teaching performance. In particular, the specific Bocconi setting allows me
to overcome two of the reasons why analyses of teachers’ effectiveness are rarely done at
the post secondary level: the lack of standardized tests and the endogeneity in students
selection of courses (and professors).
I find evidence that the introduction of research incentives affects the allocation of
effort across tasks. Results show that professors’ teaching performance gets worse while
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their research performance significantly improves. In line with the predictions of Holm-
strom and Milgrom [1991, 1994], I find that the effect is stronger for young faculty mem-
bers, more exposed to career concerns. This provides evidence of the importance of
implicit and explicit incentives in an organization. The number of working papers and
published papers of internal Bocconi faculty increases after the introduction of incen-
tives on research. The magnitude is in line with the literature on provision of incentives
(see Prendergast [1999], Lazear [2000], Bandiera et al. [2009], Checchi et al. [2014], for
example). I observe that the effect on quantity of publications does not go against the
quality of publications. This may be due to the way research incentives are structured
by Bocconi. On the other hand, teaching quality of faculty members more exposed to
research incentives is 7% of a standard deviation lower after the change in the incentive
regime. The effect is nonproportionally borne by lower ability students. My estimates
suggest that encouraging one more paper has an implicit cost of 0.3 standard deviation on
teaching quality. Moreover, I find evidence of positive sorting effects. After the change in
incentives, lower quality researchers left Bocconi faculty and, since teaching and research
ability are positively correlated, the policy attracted also good teachers.
My results suggest that it is beneficial to evaluate new policies not in isolation but as
part of a coherent incentive system. I believe this paper delivers two important policy-
relevant messages. First, since the negative effect on teaching is not homogenously borne
by the entire students population, there is room for systems of allocation of tasks and
courses to teachers that match successful scholars with those students who benefit more
from their knowledge and that minimize the consequences of possible distortions. Second,
I show that, while at the margin there is a trade-off between teaching and research, the
overall effect is ambiguous: universities are also able to keep only good researchers under
the new incentive regime and, since good researchers are also good teachers, teaching
quality will improve. Finally, i provide the first piece of evidence on the correlation be-
tween research and teaching ability. This has important implications for the design of
professors’ incentives and hiring schemes. Policies aimed at increasing teachers’ special-
ization that propose to dedicate part of the faculty exclusively to teaching and part of
it exclusively to research, should take into consideration that good researchers are also
good teachers on average.
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A Appendix A
Given the exponential utility function and normality of i, the agent receives certainty
equivalent
CE = brαrer + btαtet + s− 1
2
(e2r + e
2
t )− δeret −
η
2
(b2tσt + b
2
rσr) (11)
The first order conditions obtained from maximizing the expected utility of the agent
with respect to er and et are:
αrbr = er + δet; αtbt = et + δer (12)
and the optimal (internal) solutions are:
e∗r =
brαr − δbtαt
1− δ2 ; e
∗
t =
btαt − δbrαr
1− δ2 (13)
Therefore, taking the partial derivatives with respect to br, I get:
∂e∗r
∂br
=
αr
1− δ2 > 0;
∂e∗t
∂br
= − δαr
1− δ2 =
{
> 0 ifδ < 0
< 0 ifδ > 0
(14)
To show the results stated in Proposition 2, I take the derivatives also with respect to
ability:
∂2e∗r
∂br∂αr
=
1
1− δ2 > 0;
∂e∗t
∂br∂αr
= − δ
1− δ2 =
{
> 0 ifδ < 0
< 0 ifδ > 0
(15)
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Figure 1: Research Difference in Difference graphs
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Figure 2: Teaching Difference in Difference graphs
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Figure 3: Alternative identification strategies graphs
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Figure 4: Robustness of teachers fixed effects
Teaching Research
Figure 5: Correlation research and teaching quality
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Tables
Table 1: Descriptive statistics Students
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1=female 0.469 0.499 0 1
year birth 1985 3.249 1954 1993
1=italian 0.973 0.163 0 1
1=from Milan 0.246 0.431 0 1
hs grade 0.899 0.103 0.6 1
exam grades 25.532 3.532 18 31
N 501189
30
Table 2: Types of Teacher contracts
Description category
Adjunct Professor assistant
Researcher Bocconi assistant
Assistant professor Bocconi assistant
Assistant Professor (Job Market) Bocconi assistant
Assistant Professor (Young Foreigners) Bocconi assistant
1 year scholar Bocconi assistant
2 year scholar Bocconi assistant
3 year contract researcher Bocconi assistant
Phd Student Bocconi assistant
Assistant professor Bocconi senior assistant
Researcher Bocconi assistant
Full contract researcher Bocconi assistant
Researcher Bocconi on leave assistant
Associate professor Bocconi associate
Full Professor Bocconi full
Extraordinary professor Bocconi full
Non academics (expert in the subject) non academics
Associate professor other university other univ
Associate professor Bocconi on leave other univ
Temporary contract collaborator SDAa other univ
Collaborator SDA other univ
permanent contract collaborator Research centers other univ
Full contract researcher SDA other univ
Lecturer SDA other univ
Lecturer SDA Senior other univ
Full Professor other university other univ
Full Professor Bocconi on leave other univ
Associate professor other university other univ
Full Professor other university other univ
Researcher other university other univ
Extraordinary professor other university other univ
Visiting Professor Long Term other univ
Visiting Professor Short Term other univ
the big amount of contracts is due to the fact that identical contracts were
having different names over the years.
a SDA is the Bocconi School of Managers. It offers MBAs and master course
only. Faculty is hired and promoted according to different and independent
standards.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics - Teachers
Internal External Diff
Teachers’ descriptives
N teaching hours per class 38.91 33.91 5.47***
(16.60) (17.44) (1.34)
Age 43.18 41.29 1.89**
(9.45) (7.80) (0.77)
% female 32.27 34.25 -0.20
(0.47) (0.47) (0.045)
Teachers’ Department
Accounting 14.8 % 20.8%
Math/Stat 13.3% 24.6%
Economics 20.2% 13.8%
Finance 16.7% 7.4%
Management 39.0% 33.5%
Tot 100% 100%
Teachers’ Position
% Assistant prof 27.03%
% Associate prof 15.52%
% Full prof 15.33%
% Non academic 17.36%
% Other univ prof 13.43%
% Lecturers 2.45%
in parenthesis standard deviation (columns 1 and 2) and
standard errors (column 3).
Table 4: Random Allocation
Av. final hs gradea Av. female Av. from Mi Sd final hs grade
internal 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002)
age 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
female 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
coordinator 0.000 -0.001 0.003 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
N 3889 3889 3889 3889
course*year fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
F stat joint sign 0.75 0.95 0.39 1.58
Robust standard errors clustered by course in parentheses.
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Table 5: Summary statistics-Research
Overall Post 2006 Pre 2006 Diff
N publications
Internal 2005 0.539 0.680 0.302 0.381***
sd 1.561 (0.061)
External 2005 0.416 0.481 0.264 0.239***
sd 1.318 (0.042)
Diff 0.199 0.199** 0.037*** 0.143**
(0.199) (0.100) (0.071) (0.074)
N publications (Bocconi index)
Internal 2005 0.814 0.927 0.625 0.336***
sd 2.328 (0.084)
External 2005 0.575 0.634 0.437 0.251***
sd 1.944 (0.080)
Diff 0.293 0.293** 0.187* 0.085
N working papers (Google Scholar)
Internal 2005 1.506 1.692 1.193 0.526***
sd 2.583 (0.126)
External 2005 1.052 1.159 0.809 0.343***
sd 2.278 (0.105)
Diff 0.533 0.533** 0.385*** 0.182*
(0.533) (0.172) (0.191) (0.164)
sd (or se) in parenthesis
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Table 6: Effect on Research
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Dependent variable: N Pub N pub(1/2)
1=internal*post2006 0.206** 0.142** 0.081**
(0.100) (0.070) (0.034)
1=junior pr * post2006 0.224* 0.157* 0.087**
(0.114) (0.091) (0.039)
1=full pr* post2006 0.137 0.099 0.065
(0.186) (0.123) (0.050)
N 5230 5230 5230 5230 5230 5230
Dependent variable: N Pub (weighted by Bocconi) N pub w(1/2)
=internal*post2006 0.315*** 0.130 0.082**
(0.103) (0.098) (0.041)
1=junior pr * post2006 0.266** 0.154 0.094**
(0.110) (0.109) (0.047)
1=full pr* post2006 0.496** 0.064 0.050
(0.231) (0.174) (0.060)
N 5209 5209 5209 5209 5209 5209
Dependent variable: N wp (Google Scholar) N wp(1/2)
1=internal*post2006 0.711*** 0.148 0.091*
(0.166) (0.139) (0.052)
1=junior pr * post2006 0.492*** 0.212* 0.120**
(0.166) (0.136) (0.059)
1=full pr* post2006 1.572*** -0.035 0.008
(0.404) (0.203) (0.073)
N 5113 5113 5113 5113 5113 5113
Teacher fe No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in parentheses. Additional controls: age, age squared, academic
year fixed effects. Years between 2001 and 2010. Only professors included in the analysis on teaching. Junior
professors are assistant and associate professors.
a Publications are weighted in the same way Bocconi University assigns monetary incentives. I give weight=15 if
articles are in journals considered by Bocconi as belonging to band “A+”, weight=7 if journals are considered
as belonging to band “A”, weight=3 if belonging to band “B” and weight=1 if not belonging to any band. The
index is computed as Σi(wighti ∗ pubi)/Nauthorsi where i is a publication published by professor p in year t.
b This is the internal status in 2005
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Table 7: Step 1: regression on stu-
dents micro data.
Dependent variable: exam grade
All
[1]
hs grade -3.704***
(0.225)
hs grade2 4.159***
(0.131)
1=female -0.051***
(0.003)
1=italian 0.142***
(0.013)
1=from Milan 0.074***
(0.003)
N 501132
Robust standard errors clustered by
class-year in parentheses. Additional
controls: dummies for type of high
school, dummies for the full
interaction of classes and years
(αpct).
Table 8: Descriptives Teaching quality
αpct
Overall Post 2006 Pre 2006 Diff
Internal 2005 mean -0.020 0.146 -0.197 0.343***
sd 0.632 0.024
External 2005 mean 0.074 0.239 -0.192 0.431***
sd 0.645 0.026
Diff -0.093*** -0.005 -0.088***
0.033 0.015 0.036
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Table 9: Step 2: regression at teacher level - students’ grades
[1] [2] [3] [4]
int*post06 -0.011 -0.037**
(0.012) (0.018)
jun pr*post06 -0.014 -0.042**
(0.013) (0.020)
full pr*post06 -0.001 -0.023
(0.016) (0.022)
N 3889 3889 3889 3889
Teachers fe No No Yes Yes
Year*course*degree pr fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in parentheses. Regressions
are weighted by number of teaching hours per class. Additional controls:
age and age squared of teachers, class size, class average final high school
grade. Junior professors are assistant and associate professors.
a Status as it was before 2006
b The number of observations is lower because Bocconi collected students
evaluations in only a subsample of courses for the years 2004/2005 and
2005/2006.
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Table 10: regression at student level - students’ grades
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Dependent variable: stud grade (std)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
inta*post06 -0.037*** 0.002
(0.014) (0.016)
juna pr*post06 -0.045*** -0.005
(0.016) (0.017)
fulla pr*post06 -0.009 0.028
(0.020) (0.022)
inta*post06*mid ability stud -0.079***
(0.014)
inta*post06*low ability stud -0.097***
(0.020)
juna*post06*mid ability stud -0.077***
(0.015)
juna*post06*low ability stud -0.100***
(0.021)
orda*post06*mid ability stud -0.086***
(0.022)
orda*post06*low ability stud -0.086**
(0.036)
N 346628 346628 346628 346628
Teachers fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year*course*degree pr fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control set: teacher age, age sq, student gender, hs, whether Italian, whether from
Milano. Se clustered by teacher. Ability based on final high school grade of students:
High ability (omitted)=between 1 and 0.9; middle ability = between 0.8 and 0.9; low
ability: below 0.8
a Status as it was before 2006
b The number of observations is lower because Bocconi collected students evaluations in
only a subsample of courses for the years 2004/2005 and 2005/2006.
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Table 11: Robustness checks Teaching
no also include weight by
09-10-11 lecturers switches h. taught
[1] [2] [3] [4]
int05a*post06 -0.037* -0.034* -0.035*
(0.020) (0.018) (0.021)
lecturera*post06 -0.047
(0.042)
intb*post06 -0.027*
(0.016)
N 2848 4201 3889 3889
Teachers fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in parentheses.
Additional controls: age and age squared of teachers, teacher
experience in Bocconi class size. Column (1) excludes the years when
teaching incentives were also in place; column (2) includes lecturers
and specifies a different treatment effect for lecturers; column (3)
includes switchers and teachers fixed effects; column (4) weights
professors by number of teaching hours.
a Status as it was before 2006
b contemporaneous status
Table 12: Robustness checks Teaching 2
Grading 1=course 1=Num of
Dep var: αptc coordin
a taught hb
[1] [2] [3] [4]
int*post 06 -0.045** -0.042** 0.025 0.671
(0.020) (0.020) (0.037) (1.084)
int*post 06*objc 0.024
(0.047)
int*post 06*math depd 0.017
(0.046)
N 3889 3889 3889 2989e
Teachers fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in parentheses. Additional
controls: age and age squared of teachers, dummies for teacher experience in
Bocconi.
a 1=whether professor p in year t was the course coordinator
b Tot n of teaching hours in year t by professor p
c Objective if the name of the course includes the words ”math”, ”stat”,
”quantit”
d Math if the teacher belongs to the math and statistics departments
e N of observations at the teacher-year level (if a teacher teaches more than one
courses n of teaching hours are summed)
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Table 13: Robustness checks- teaching 3: average class
grades
sd av. class gr internal sd av. class gr external
2001 0.390 0.434
2002 0.283 0.379
2003 0.390 0.453
2004 0.415 0.375
2005 0.423 0.431
2006 0.407 0.477
2007 0.375 0.400
2008 0.450 0.349
2009 0.406 0.442
2010 0.428 0.425
2011 0.468 0.404
a This is the standard deviation of average class grades within
courses (of classes that sit the same exam).
Table 14: Heterogeneity by teachers’ ability
Dep. var αpct n pub n pub weight n wp (google)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
int*post 06* ability q 1 -0.087** 0.146*** 0.185** 0.296***
(0.037) (0.042) (0.073) (0.113)
int*post 06* ability q 2 -0.036 0.200*** 0.351*** 0.166
(0.041) (0.070) (0.102) (0.172)
int*post 06* ability q 3 -0.035 0.184 0.197 0.095
(0.042) (0.140) (0.257) (0.254)
N 3770 6281 6264 6082
Additional controls: age, age squared, all double interactions, teacher fixed effects, year
fixed effects.
Table 15: Teaching and research ability
Dep. var= Teaching Fe
everybody N>5a everybody N>5a
[1] [2] [3] [4]
research FE 0.715*** 0.795*** 0.542*** 0.640***
(0.067) (0.102) (0.062) (0.094)
N 313 109 313 109
Controls No No Yes Yes
Additional controls: age at entry (linear and squared), gender.
a N>5 is referred to the n of observations over which is estimated the
teacher fixed effect in the teaching quality regression (for the
researh quality regression N=10 for every teacher)
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Table 16: Sorting out
Fixed Effects all pre 06 Fixed Effects
Dep Variable: Research Fe Fe Teaching Fe Research Fe Teaching
(θrp) (θ
t
p) (θ
r
p) (θ
t
p)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
1=exit after 2006 -0.133** -0.113** -0.099* -0.100
(0.063) (0.054) (0.055) (0.074)
1=exit pre 2006 -0.044 0.023 -0.008 -0.040
(0.054) (0.034) (0.046) (0.036)
N 345 352 232 232
a Excluding those exiting because retiring, omitted category=those staying. additional
controls: dummies for year of entry, gender, age at entry, age at entry squared.
Table 17: Sorting in
Dep Variable: Research Fe Fe Teaching
(θrp) (θtp)
[1] [2]
1=entry after 2006 -0.051 0.049
(0.091) (0.056)
tr y entry 0.009 0.099***
(0.011) (0.013)
tr y entry sq 0.001* -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
N 350 352
Excluding those exiting because retiring, omitted
category=those staying. additional controls: dummies
for year of entry, gender, age at entry, age at entry
squared. Columns 3 and 4: omitted category= entry
before 2006, additional controls=time trend of year of
entry (linear and squared), age at entry (linear and
squared and triple), gender. Only for teachers eneterd
after 2000.
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Table 18: Summary statistics on number
of publications
Bologna Bocconi diff
Junior prof
N pub 0.201 0.417 -0.217***
(0.018) (0.022) 0.033
1221 2197
Senior prof
N pub 0.280 0.481 -0.201***
(0.030) (0.043) (0.051)
792 709
Table 19: Alternative identification strategies - Research
age groups Bologna prof
< m age (43) > m age (43) All Jun Full
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
internal*post06 0.170* 0.119
(0.096) (0.124)
bocconi*post06 0.162**
(0.064)
jun bocc*post06 0.221***
(0.080)
ord bocc*post06 0.051
(0.107)
N 3119 2111 4497 3063 1434
Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in parentheses. Additional controls: age and
age squared of teachers, year fixed effects. column (1) and (2) use as control group
external teachers teachers in the same age group (< or > meanage), columns (3) and (4)
use as control group use as control group professors from Bologna University.
a Status as it was before 2006
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Table 20: Alternative Identification Strategy - Teaching
Dep Var: αpct
only only control=professors just
(< 43) (> 43) became tenured
[1] [2] [3] [4]
internal*post06 -0.061* -0.034
(0.032) (0.029)
no full pre05*post06 -0.221*** -0.042*
(0.052) (0.025)
N 1958 1931 2068 2068
Teachers fe Yes Yes No Yes
Year*course*deg fe Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors clustered by teacher in parentheses. Additional
controls: age and age squared of teachers, dummies for year of arrival in
Bocconi. Only internal teachers (in 2005).
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